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Abstract
The way choices are framed influences decision-making. These “framing effects” emerge through the integration of
emotional responses into decision-making under uncertainty. It was previously reported that susceptibility to the
framing effect was reduced in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) due to a reduced tendency to
incorporate emotional information into the decision-making process. However, recent research indicates that,
where observed, emotional processing impairments in ASD may be due to co-occurring alexithymia. Alexithymia is
thought to arise due to impaired interoception (the ability to perceive the internal state of one’s body), raising the
possibility that emotional signals are not perceived and thus not integrated into decision-making in those with
alexithymia and that therefore reduced framing effects in ASD are a product of co-occurring alexithymia rather than
ASD per se. Accordingly, the present study compared framing effects in autistic individuals with neurotypical
controls matched for alexithymia. Results showed a marked deviation between groups. The framing effect was,
in line with previous data, significantly smaller in autistic individuals, and there was no relationship between
alexithymia or interoception and decision-making in the ASD group. In the neurotypical group, however, the size
of the framing effect was associated with alexithymia and interoception, even after controlling for autistic traits.
These results demonstrate that although framing effects are associated with interoception and alexithymia in the
neurotypical population, emotional and interoceptive signals have less impact upon the decision-making process in ASD.
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The way options are framed can induce bias in decision-
making. Options presented in a “gain” frame (you keep
$30 of an initial $50) are preferred to mathematically
equivalent options presented in a “loss” frame (you lose
$20 of an initial $50). The increase in participants
choosing the option when in the gain frame compared
to the loss frame is known as the “framing effect” (FE
[1]). FEs index the influence of emotion on decision-
making, with converging evidence for the role of
prefrontal-amygdala circuity [2, 3] and insular cortex [4].
Studying FEs in clinical groups helps explicate its
neurocognitive basis [5] and may aid the design of
interventions to reduce symptoms related to abnormal
decision-making. FEs have therefore been investigated in
anxiety [6] and in one previous study [7] in autism
spectrum disorder (ASD). The present study re-examines
FEs in individuals with ASD after accounting for impaired
interoception (perception of the state of one’s own body).
This is necessary due to recent claims of atypical intero-
ception in ASD [8–12] and of a role for interoception in
decision-making [13, 14]. It was previously found that
autistic1 individuals are less susceptible to FEs because
they do not incorporate emotional information into
decision-making. It was suggested that, although this
may enhance logical consistency, insensitivity to
emotional signals during decision-making may also
underpin putative core deficits in ASD (such as im-
paired empathy and emotion recognition).
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The characterization of ASD as primarily an affective
disorder has been questioned due to recent research
highlighting the co-occurrence of autism and alexithy-
mia. Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties identify-
ing and describing one’s own emotions, and recent work
suggests that it is best characterized as a general intero-
ceptive impairment [15–19]. Elevated rates of alexithy-
mia are observed in ASD [20–22] and other clinical
conditions, including anxiety, depression, and eating
disorders [23–25]. Importantly, however, 10 % of the
population are estimated to have alexithymia in the
absence of any psychiatric or neurological condition.
Alexithymia is therefore an independent construct with
its own genetic and neurocognitive basis [26, 27], instead
of being a feature or symptom of other clinical disorders.
This means that groups with and without ASD can be
matched for alexithymia (e.g., using the 20-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale [TAS-20] [28]) to examine the relative
contributions of ASD and alexithymia to socio-emotional
functioning. Using this methodology, several studies now
demonstrate that co-occurring alexithymia is responsible
for many of the affective impairments previously thought
to be due to ASD [29–33]. The finding that alexithymia,
and not ASD per se, is responsible for affective impair-
ments raises the question of whether the reduction in FEs
previously attributed to ASD is in fact due to alexithymia.
The question is especially pertinent when one considers
alexithymia to be a general impairment of interoception
because interoceptive ability, driven by insula activity [34],
has been demonstrated to moderate the effects of emotion
on decision-making (e.g., [13]). This suggestion is consist-
ent with theories postulating that the insula integrates
intero-and exteroceptive signals about uncertainty to
guide decision-making [35, 36].
More recently, however, research has shown divergent
roles of autism and alexithymia across high-level judg-
ment and decision-making tasks that invoke emotional
processing. For example, Brewer and colleagues [37] ex-
amined moral decision-making in those with and with-
out ASD as a function of alexithymia. Existing models of
moral reasoning posit two routes by which one can
arrive at a judgment of moral acceptability—one based
on emotional information driven by empathy for the
victim’s distress and the other based on societal rules
relating to the acceptability of specific behaviors. In
those without ASD, moral judgments were based on
emotional information, and increasing levels of alexithy-
mia led to increasingly atypical judgments. In those with
ASD, however, emotional information was not used to
make moral judgments, and therefore moral judgments
were not impacted by levels of alexithymia. This finding
suggests that alexithymia may have a different effect on
judgment and decision-making in people with and
without ASD.
It is clear that there is theoretical impetus to investi-
gate emotional decision-making in ASD while ac-
counting for the contribution of alexithymia and
interoception. The present study therefore compared
the magnitude of the FE between individuals with
ASD and an alexithymia-matched control group. We
hypothesized that there would be a difference in the
FE between individuals with and without ASD (see [7])
and also that alexithymia and interoception would be
associated with the magnitude of the FE. However,
following recent evidence [37–39], it was also pre-
dicted that the relationship between interoception,
alexithymia, and the FE may be reduced in autistic
individuals relative to neurotypical individuals.
Method
Participants
A power analysis [40] was conducted to inform sample
size considerations based on the large group difference
in the FE (Cohen’s d = 3.62) observed by De Martino
et al. [7]. This indicated that four participants were
required per group where power = 0.95, α = 0.05. How-
ever, in order to ensure there was adequate variance
on autism and alexithymia scores, and perform regres-
sion analyses controlling for confounding variables, 42
individuals with (n = 21) and without (n = 21) ASD
participated in the study. This sample size also served
to ensure the ASD and control groups could be
matched on demographic variables and alexithymia
(see below). Two participants were excluded. In the
control group, one participant was excluded because
their framing effect was >3 SD above the group mean.
In the ASD group, one participant failed to respond
on >50 % of trials and so did not complete the task.
Therefore, a total of 40 participants were included in
the final analysis. Twenty participants with ASD were
age, IQ [41–43], and gender matched with 20 neuroty-
pical controls (Table 1).
All autistic participants were recruited from a database
of volunteers that have received a clinical diagnosis of
ASD from an independent clinician (as per the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th
Edition [44]). Diagnosis was confirmed using module 4
of the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule
(ADOS [45]) by a research-reliable administrator, and
all participants in the ASD group met criteria for
autism or autism spectrum disorder. Control partici-
pants were recruited from a database of volunteers
who reported no known psychiatric, neurological, or
neurodevelopmental disorder (including ASD). All par-
ticipants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient
(AQ [46]) as a measure of autistic traits. The ASD
group scored significantly higher on this measure than
the control group, in line with previous literature [46].
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Importantly, participants also completed the 20-item
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20 [28]). Each group
contained individuals with (TAS-20 score of ≥61), and
without, alexithymia, such that the ASD and control
groups were matched on trait alexithymia (see Table 1).
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and gave informed consent prior to participation. Ethical
clearance was granted by the local ethics committee.
Materials and procedure
Emotional decision-making task
The FE was measured using the financial decision-
making task first reported in 2006 [2] and used by De
Martino et al. in 2008 [7]. It is widely used to study
emotional decision-making and has shown to be a
robust and replicable measure of the FE [47]. At the
beginning of each trial, participants are shown a sum of
money (e.g., “you receive £50”) for 2 s. Four different
starting amounts are used: £100, £75, £50, and £25.
Participants are informed that they are unable to keep
the total sum of money and given 4 s to decide between
a “sure” and a “gamble” (risky) option using a response
keypad. If the participant did not respond within 4 s, the
trial was omitted from analysis. Crucially, the sure
option is presented in either a “gain” frame as the sum
of money retained from the initial starting amount (e.g.,
keep £20 of £50) or “loss” frame as money lost from the
initial amount (e.g., lose £30 of £50). The “gamble” is
identical in both frames and represented by a pie-chart
showing the probability of winning or losing (Fig. 1).
Four different probabilities were used in the experiment:
20, 40, 60, and 80 %. The expected value of the options
was balanced in each trial (except for catch trials, see
below) and mathematically equivalent between the sure
option and the gamble. For example, if participants
initially received £50, they were then required to choose
between the options “keep £20” or a gamble with a 40 %
chance of winning £50 and a 60 % chance of winning
nothing. The response to the framing manipulation was
first measured for each individual in each group, by
Table 1 Participants and group matching
ASD Controls Comparison
N 20 20 –
Gender 17 males, 3 females 14 males, 6 females χ2(1) = 1.29, p = 0.26
Mean age (years) 32.70 (11.18) 34.10 (14.20) p = 0.74
Mean full-scale IQ 108.55 (12.80) 110.95 (13.62) p = 0.57
Mean AQ 35.45 (7.47) 20.80 (8.94) p < 0.001
Mean TAS-20 58.11 (13.00) 55.37 (18.33) p = 0.63
Number of participants with/without alexithymia 8/12 11/9 χ2(1) = 0.90, p = 0.34
Mean TA 53.75 (10.15) 47.80 (14.09) p = 0.13
Mean SA 39.90 (9.62) 36.80 (10.47) p = 0.34
ADOS classification 9 autism, 11 autism spectrum – –
Mean ADOS-G score 9.50 (2.44) – –
Note. Mean age, gender, autism-spectrum quotient (AQ), 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), (state (SA) and trait (TA)) anxiety scores, and IQ scores for
the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) group and the matched neurotypical controls. Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule (ADOS) score and classification details for
the ASD group: A higher score represents greater autism severity. Standard deviations are shown in brackets. The IQ score for one control participant was unavailable
and therefore not reflected in the group mean
a
b
Fig. 1 Measuring the framing effect. Participants are shown the
sum of money received to play in that trial for 2 s (e.g., “you receive
£50”). They are required to choose between a “gamble” or “sure”
option within 4 s. The “sure” option is presented as either a the sum
of money retained from the initial starting amount (e.g., keep £20 of
£50—gain frame) or b money lost from the initial amount (e.g., lose
£30 of £50—loss frame). The “gamble” is identical in both frames
and represented by a pie-chart showing the probability of winning
(yellow) or losing (blue). Feedback about trial outcomes is not
presented during the experiment
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calculating the percentage of trials in which participants
chose the “gamble” versus “sure” option within each
frame. The size of each individual’s FE was computed by
taking the difference between the percentage of trials in
which they gambled in the gain from the loss frame;
therefore, greater susceptibility to FEs is denoted by a
larger value.
Given the equivalence of the choices in terms of
expected outcomes, “catch” trials (32 in each session)
were included to ensure that participants remained
engaged in the task. In these catch trials, within both
frames, expected outcomes for the sure and gamble
option were clearly unbalanced: in half of the trials
(“gamble weighted”), the gamble option was preferable
(e.g., 95 % probability of winning by taking the gamble
option vs a sure choice of 50 % of the initial amount),
and for the other half of trials (“sure weighted”), the
sure option was preferable (e.g., 5 % probability of
winning by taking the gamble option vs a sure choice
of 50 % of the initial amount). As in the main experi-
mental trials, the catch trials were also presented in
either a gain or a loss frame.
Measuring interoception and time estimation
Interoceptive accuracy (IA; see [48, 49]) was measured
using the Heartbeat Tracking task [50]. Participants were
seated, required to close their eyes, and silently count
their heartbeats during four intervals (25, 35, 45, and
100 s). The order of intervals was randomized across
participants. Participants were instructed not to meas-
ure their pulse by any means other than “concentrating
on their heart beats.” Heartbeat signals were acquired
using a pulse oximeter (Contec Systems CMS50D+;
Qinhuangdao, China) attached to the left index finger,
while the right arm was placed on the table.
Performance on the Heartbeat Tracking task may be
influenced by one’s ability to sustain attention during
counting tasks and/or accurately estimate time [51].
Participants were therefore instructed to judge the dur-
ation of three randomized intervals (19, 37, and 49 s;
e.g., [52]). Performance on the Time Estimation (TE)
task is known to follow a similar distribution to the
Heart Beat Tracking task in participants with and with-
out ASD, thereby indicating the tasks are matched in
difficulty [16]. The TE task was performed by partici-
pants while remaining in the position used for the
interoception task.
IA was quantified on a scale between 0 and 100 %
using a standard transformation: 1/4 Σ(1-(|recorded
number of heartbeatsinterval − counted number of
heartbeatsinterval|/recorded heart beatsinterval)) × 100.
Higher scores are indicative of better IA. TE score was
also computed on a scale of 0 to 100 % using the follow-
ing formula: 1/3 Σ(1-(|estimated elapsed timeinterval −
actual elapsed timeinterval|/actual elapsed timeinterval)) ×
100. Higher scores are indicative of better TE ability.
Confounding variables
A number of clinical conditions have been associated
with interoception (see [53]). Anxiety has been most
closely associated with IA [54] and the FE [55]; there-
fore, in addition to the TAS-20 and AQ, participants
completed the Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory
([56]; Table 1).
Procedure
The study was conducted in a dimly lit and quiet testing
cubicle. Participants completed the questionnaires immedi-
ately before the Heart Beat Tracking/TE tasks. The order in
which the interoception and TE tasks were completed was
counterbalanced across participants. After familiarization
with the decision-making task and several practice trials,
the participants began the decision-making procedure. This
was divided into three sessions of 96 pseudorandomized
trials, each comprising 32 loss frames, 32 gain frames, and
32 catch trials. The percentage of the money offered, total
starting amount, and number of trials per session were
counterbalanced between frame conditions. Each session
was 17 min in duration and interleaved with a compulsory
rest period (3 min). The complete procedure was approxi-
mately 1 h long and presented using PsychoPy [57, 58] on a
22-in. Samsung SyncMaster 2233RZ LCD monitor (reso-
lution of 1680 × 1050 and refresh rate of 120 Hz).
Data analysis
Data were analyzed in three ways. First, group-wise
analyses compared individuals with and without an ASD
diagnosis. Second, correlational analyses were used to
determine the relationships between interoception, alex-
ithymia, autism, and the FE. Finally, moderation analyses
examined whether the relationships between interocep-
tion, alexithymia, and the FE were different in the ASD
and control groups.
Results
We initially established that, in total, 0.31 and 0.80 %
of trials were excluded for control and autistic partici-
pants, respectively. There was no significant group dif-
ference in the number of excluded trials, t(38) = 1.43,
p = 0.17, d = 0.45, 95 % CI for d[−0.17, 1.08].2 There
was also no significant group difference between the
ASD and control groups in IA (control: M = 70.99, SD =
20.40, ASD: M = 65.54, SD = 25.85, t(38) = 0.74, p = 0.46,
d = 0.23, 95 % CI for d[−0.39, 0.85]). However, autistic par-
ticipants significantly outperformed the control group on
the TE procedure (control: M = 72.40, SD = 19.96, ASD:
M = 85.24, SD = 11.55, t(38) = 2.49, p = 0.017, d = 0.79,
95 % CI for d[−0.14, 1.43]).
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FEs were evident in both individuals with and without
ASD, as demonstrated by the greater percentage of trials
in which participants chose the gamble option in the
loss than gain frame (Fig. 2a). However, the size of the
FE (i.e., the difference between gambling in the Loss
compared with Gain Frame) was substantially smaller
and less variable in the ASD compared with the control
group (Fig. 2b).
These data were analyzed using mixed model ANOVA
with frame (gain, loss) as the within-subjects factor and
group (ASD, control) as the between-subjects factor.
There was no main effect of group, F(1, 38) = 0.83, p =
0.37, ηp
2 = 0.02 [90 % CI = 0, 0.05], indicating there was
no overall group difference in the number of trials on
which they chose to gamble. There was a large and signifi-
cant effect of frame, F(1, 38) = 29.59, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.44
[90 % CI = 0.23, 0.57], which confirmed the effectiveness
of the framing manipulation. Crucially, the group × frame
interaction reached significance, F(1, 38) = 6.35, p = 0.016,
ηp
2 = 0.14 [90 % CI = 0.02, 0.31], which indicated that sus-
ceptibility to the framing manipulation was different be-
tween those with and without ASD. Planned comparisons
confirmed both control t(19) = 4.42, p < 0.001, d = 1.43,
95 % CI for d[0.71, 2.14], and autistic t(19) = 3.34, p =
0.003, d = 1.08, 95 % CI for d[0.39, 1.76], participants
gambled significantly more in the loss compared
with the gain frame. Importantly, however, the size
of the FE was significantly larger in the control
group than in the ASD group, t(38) = 2.52 p = 0.016,
d = 0.80, 95 % CI for d[0.15, 1.44]. This result
supported our first hypothesis.
Data from catch trials were inspected to examine
whether the participants were engaged in the task and to
assess if the ASD participants were responding to mon-
etary incentives in a manner that was comparable to the
control group. The analysis of catch trials also deter-
mined whether overall risk tendency was matched across
groups. Only one participant in each group showed an
atypical pattern of responding, indicative of extreme
aversion to risk (i.e., choosing not to gamble on trials
when there was a 95 % probability of keeping the initial
amount compared to 50 % probability of a win if they
chose the “sure” choice). However, the pattern of
significance detailed above remained when both indi-
viduals were excluded from analysis (e.g., group × frame
interaction; F(1, 36) = 6.38, p = 0.016, ηp
2 = 0.15 [90 %
CI = 0.02, 0.32]). Furthermore, re-including all partici-
pants, and in line with previous data [7], the number of
catch trials on which participants gambled was not
different between groups, t(38) = 0.94, p = 0.35, d = 0.30,
95 % CI for d[−0.33,0.92]. The critical group × frame
interaction also remained significant after including
individual performance on catch trial data as a covari-
ate in the analysis, F(1, 37) = 5.40, p = 0.026, ηp
2 = 0.13
[90 % CI = 0.01, 0.29].
In line with the existing literature (e.g., [16]), there was
an association between IA and the TAS-20, across groups
(r = −0.58, p < 0.001), in the control group (r = −0.60, p =
0.005), and ASD group (r = −0.61, p = 0.004). Support-
ing our second hypothesis, after collapsing across
groups, the size of the FE was negatively correlated
with both autistic traits (r = −0.43, p = 0.005) and alex-
ithymia scores (r = −0.36, p = 0.023). Conversely, there
was a positive correlation between IA and the FEs (r =
0.37, p = 0.019) but no such relationship with TE ability
(r = 0.02, p = 0.92).
Fig. 2 The framing effect (FE) by group. a The percentage of trials in which participants chose to gamble in the Loss compared with the Gain
frame. Although both controls and autistic participants gambled significantly more in the loss than gain frame, the size of b the FE (i.e., the
difference between gambling in the loss and gain frame) was significantly larger in the control group. Error bars denote ±1 SEM
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We conducted moderation analyses to investigate
whether the relationship between interoception and the
FE and the association between alexithymia and the FE
(i) significantly varied as a function of group and (ii) held
after controlling for potentially confounding variables.
Participant age, IQ, state, and trait anxiety scores (see
Table 1), TE ability, group (ASD, control), and alexithy-
mia (TAS-20 scores) were entered as predictor variables
into step 1 of a hierarchical regression. Group was the
only significant predictor of the FE (β = 0.43, t = 2.43, p =
0.021), whereas alexithymia (β = −0.27, t = −1.68, p = 0.10)
and the other variables failed to reach significance (other
ps > 0.16). Together, step 1 explained 32.90 % of variance in
the FE. When the alexithymia × group term was added to
the model in step 2, the results differed such that in
addition to group (β = 0.41, t = 2.49, p = 0.019), both state
(β = −0.52, t = −2.29, p = 0.029) and trait (β = 0.48, t = 2.05,
p = 0.049) anxiety scores were significant predictors of a lar-
ger FE. Again, alexithymia and other confounding variables
remained non-significant (ps > 0.34). Most importantly,
however, the predictor coding the interaction between
alexithymia and group was a significant predictor of the
FE (β = −0.40, t = −2.27), significantly increasing the
variance accounted for by 9.80 %, F(1, 30) = 5.14, p =
0.031. This analysis confirmed that the relationship be-
tween alexithymia and the FE was moderated by group.
Alexithymia and IA were highly correlated. In order
to avoid problems with multicollinearity, a second
moderation analysis was conducted with IA replacing
alexithymia in steps 1 and 2, and accordingly, an IA ×
group interaction term in step 2. Group was a
significant predictor of the FE (β = 0.41, t = 2.43, p = 0.021),
as was IA (β = 0.33, t = 2.13, p = 0.041). The other variables
in the first step failed to reach significance (other ps > 0.23)
and altogether, step 1 explained 36.1 % of variance in the
FE. In step 2, both group (β = 0.41, t = 2.57, p = 0.015) and
IA (β = 0.40, t = 2.68, p = 0.012) remained as significant
predictors. More importantly, the interaction between these
variables was also a predictor of the FE (β = 0.32, t = 2.27),
significantly increasing the variance accounted for by
9.40 %, F(1, 31) = 5.17, p = 0.030, and thus confirmed that
the relationship between interoception and the FE was
different between groups. These patterns of results
supported our third hypothesis, which also held when both
moderation analyses were repeated without including age,
IQ, TE ability, and anxiety scores (this analysis which just
includes the variables of key interest may be more
appropriate given the sample size).
Correlational analyses showed that both the rela-
tionship between alexithymia and the FE and the
association between interoception and the FE were
only observed in, and therefore being driven by, the
control group (Fig. 3). Greater IA (r = 0.55, p = 0.012)
and lower alexithymia scores (r = −0.49, p = 0.029)
were associated with a larger FE. The FE was not
associated with any of the other demographic or po-
tentially confounding variables (all ps > 0.11). In con-
trast, there was no relationship between alexithymia and
the FE (r = 0.03, p = 0.89), or interoception and the FE
(r = 0.14, p = 0.57) in the ASD group; however, there
was a negative association between age and the size
of the FE (r = −0.69, p = 0.001).
Fig. 3 Associations between interoception, alexithymia, and framing effects. a Individuals with greater interoceptive accuracy (IA) showed a larger FE as shown
by the correlation between IA and the FE in the control group (r=0.55, p= 0.012). No such relationship was observed in the ASD group (r= 0.14, p= 0.57).
b The correlation between the TAS-20 and the FE was not significant in the ASD group (r=0.03, p=0.89), but was in the control group (r=−0.49, p= 0.029)
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Discussion
The present study investigated whether individuals with
ASD exhibit enhanced logical consistency, i.e., smaller
FEs, after accounting for alexithymia and interoception.
More generally, we sought to investigate the relationship
between interoception and decision-making which has
seldom been investigated in typical individuals and
never before in a clinical group. To these ends, a well-
established measure of the FE was used, together with a
widely used measure of interoception. Replicating a
previous study [7], FEs were significantly smaller in
autistic individuals compared to the non-autistic con-
trol group. Importantly, these results were found even
when the control group was matched for alexithymia,
suggesting that the enhanced logical consistency seen
in the ASD group was due to ASD itself, rather than
co-occurring alexithymia.
Moderation and within-group analyses demonstrated a
striking difference between the relative impact of alex-
ithymia and interoceptive ability on the ASD and control
groups. For individuals without ASD, IA and alexithymia
both significantly predicted the size of the FE, such that
better interoception (and lower trait alexithymia) was
associated with a larger FE. This result is in accordance
with the model forwarded by De Martino and colleagues
[2] in which emotional information influences decision-
making in neurotypical individuals, and the extent to
which one can accurately perceive emotional informa-
tion/arousal determines the influence it has on decision-
making (see also [13]). In contrast, alexithymia and
interoception did not predict susceptibility to the FE in
those with ASD. This differential pattern of results in
people with and without ASD indicates the use of differ-
ent strategies when making judgments: one strategy
involving gist-based, fuzzy, intuitive processes used by
non-autistic individuals, and another strategy which
recruits rule/verbatim-based analysis which is recruited
by individuals with ASD (see [59] for a neurodevelop-
mental perspective). These results are consistent with
the idea that, instead of using interoceptive or emo-
tional information, and regardless of whether they have
access to these signals, individuals with ASD use a rule-
based strategy which results in a smaller FE at the
group level (see [60]). These results, in line with our
predictions, are consistent with recent research show-
ing divergent roles of autism and alexithymia across
high-level judgment and decision-making tasks that
invoke emotional processing [37–39].
De Martino et al. [7] proposed that “although this im-
pairment in processing contextual emotional informa-
tion protects ASD subjects from the framing bias,
leading to more consistent behavior in situations of
risk, it may come at a cost of the social, emotional,
and behavioral deficits that characterize the condition”
(p. 10,749). The present study is consistent with this
proposal, insofar as it was clearly shown that autistic
individuals with social atypicalities are indeed less
susceptible to the FE. However, we found that IA and
alexithymia were not correlated with the size of FE in
ASD. This indicates that use of rule-based strategies,
leading to a smaller FE, is less related to social-
emotional atypicalities in ASD and may be more
closely related to the rigid and repetitive behavioral
difficulties in this condition. The (over) reliance on
rule-based strategies might lead to difficulties in day-
to-day functioning (e.g., insistence on sameness,
potentially leading to difficulties gaining or maintain-
ing employment in certain job roles). Equally, however,
the reduced use of interoceptive signals—and thereby
enhanced logical consistency in ASD—may confer an
advantage in many situations where emotional infor-
mation would otherwise interfere with the optimal
outcome (e.g., gambling, financial investments, and
risk assessments). More generally, neurocognitive
strengths shown by individuals with ASD are both
under researched, and/or commonly interpreted as
impairments, yet the findings from the present study
highlight that certain cognitive processes in ASD may,
depending on the situation, benefit as well as impair
day-to-day functioning (see also [61–63]). On a related
note, it is to be emphasized that, while the current
study replicates and extends De Martino and colleagues’
results [7], both studies contained high functioning adult
ASD samples which limits the generalizability of these
findings. Future research on emotional decision-making,
alexithymia, and interoception in lower functioning adults
and children with ASD are required, and such research
will more comprehensively elucidate the causes and
consequences of atypical decision-making on individuals
across the autism spectrum.
It was not possible to perform neuroimaging in the
present study; however, the current results also accord
with existing neuroscience data on the FE. The insula has
been shown to be involved in emotional decision-making,
interoception, and alexithymia [32, 34–36, 64, 65], which
together, is likely to underpin the pattern of results that
we observed in the control group. Similarly, the strength
of prefrontal-amygdala connectivity, known to be atypical
in ASD [66–68], is thought to be positively correlated with
the size of the FE. This supports the idea that emotional
information has a smaller influence on decision-making in
autistic individuals and may explain the smaller FE
observed in the ASD group.
When considered as a whole, extant research suggests
that both ASD itself and co-occurring alexithymia can con-
tribute to atypical performance in ASD in a task-dependent
manner. When interoceptive or emotion processing is
necessary and sufficient for accurate performance (e.g.,
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tasks assessing interoception, emotion perception, or
empathy), then any “ASD impairment” is likely due to
alexithymia, such that individuals with ASD without
co-occurring alexithymia are unimpaired [29–33].
However, for socio-cognitive tasks that typically
involve, but are not necessarily reliant upon, emotion
processing (moral judgments, decision-making, Theory
of Mind), then individuals with ASD may perform the
tasks atypically (demonstrating either impairments or
superior performance) because they use a non-affective
strategy to complete the task. Performance on these
latter tasks would therefore be determined by the pres-
ence of an ASD diagnosis, rather than co-occurring
alexithymia.
In addition to the primary aim of the study, these data
provide evidence for intact IA in ASD. This accords with
a recent study in which ASD and control groups were
matched for alexithymia: In line with Shah and col-
leagues’ data [16], the present study indicated that alex-
ithymia, not autism, is associated with atypical
interoception.3 Previous studies assessing interoceptive
ability in ASD which do not control for alexithymia have
produced inconsistent results [8–12], but a clearer
picture is obtained when this important source of vari-
ance is accounted for [16, 17, 19, 69] A higher incidence
of alexithymia in many psychiatric and neurological
disorders supports the inclusion of alexithymia question-
naires when studying interoception in any clinical group,
in order to decompose any reduced IA into that
accounted for by the condition itself and that accounted
for by co-occurring alexithymia [16, 17]. More generally,
interoception research is typically conducted in high
functioning adults; therefore, there is a need for intero-
ception research including a wider range of individuals
to firmly establish the existence of interoceptive impair-
ments (if any) in ASD and other clinical groups.
An enhanced TE ability in ASD relative to the control
group was also observed in these data. Time perception
was not the focus of the current study, and the TE task
was designed as a control rather than a sensitive meas-
ure of time perception ability. These factors mean that
we do not wish to draw strong conclusions from this
result, but the finding of superior time perception in aut-
istic adults accords with reports of enhanced time percep-
tion in children with ASD [70]. Similarly, the present
study was designed to investigate the relative contribu-
tions of autism, alexithymia, and interoception to the FE,
while controlling for anxiety. Nevertheless, in line with
existing research, increased anxiety was associated with
larger FEs [6, 55] after accounting for autism and alexithy-
mia. This warrants further investigation in future research
with larger samples comprising sufficient variance to fully
address the interrelationship between ASD, anxiety, alex-
ithymia, interoception, and emotional decision-making.
Finally, although the negative relationship between age
and the size of the FE in ASD was unexpected, it seems
likely that increased time living with the cognitive features
of ASD—such as a bias towards an analytical rule-based
strategy when making judgments—may increase the
impact of ASD on reduced susceptibility to FEs. Although
not observed in this study, there are reports of increased
FEs with age in typical populations, suggesting a develop-
mental approach to FEs in ASD, and other clinical groups
may prove fruitful [59].
Conclusions
In summary, the present study replicates De Martino et
al.’s finding [7] of enhanced logical consistency in ASD. It
was shown that this is unlikely to be due to co-occurring
alexithymia—instead evidence suggested that interoceptive
ability and alexithymia were unrelated to the FE in individ-
uals with ASD. In contrast, both alexithymia and intero-
ception were associated with the size of FEs in neurotypical
individuals, in line with contemporary suggestions that
interoceptive and emotional signals guide decision-making
under uncertainty [35, 36]. Together, these results reinforce
the idea that atypical decision-making is a robust feature of
ASD, while highlighting the importance of alexithymia
when studying interoception and emotional decision-
making in clinical and non-clinical samples.
Endnotes
1We use the word autistic to refer to individuals
with ASD as this terminology is preferred by these
individuals [71].
2Confidence intervals reported in the present
study were computed using the MBESS package in R
(see [72]).
3It should be noted, however, that the two samples
were partly overlapping, and so this study should not be
considered a fully independent replication.
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